According to N.J.S.A. § 34:15-17:
Unless the employer shall have actual knowledge of the occurrence of the injury, or unless the employee, or someone on his behalf, or some of the dependents, or someone on their behalf, shall give notice thereof to the employer within fourteen days of the occurrence of the injury, then no compensation shall be due until such notice is given or knowledge obtained. If the notice is given, or the knowledge obtained within thirty days from the occurrence of the injury, no want, failure, or inaccuracy of a notice shall be a bar to obtaining compensation, unless the employer shall show that he was prejudiced by such want, defect or inaccuracy, and then only to the extent of such prejudice. If the notice is given, or the knowledge obtained within ninety days, and if the employee, or other beneficiary, shall show that his failure to give prior notice was due to his mistake, inadvertence, ignorance of fact or law, or inability, or to the fraud, misrepresentation or deceit of another person, or to any other reasonable cause or excuse, then compensation may be allowed, unless, and then to the extent only that the employer shall show that he was prejudiced by failure to receive such notice. Unless knowledge be obtained, or notice given, within ninety days after the occurrence of the injury, no compensation shall be allowed.
According to Brock v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 149 N.J. 378, 385 (1997), “the two primary objectives of the notification requirement are: (1) to afford the employer a timely opportunity to investigate the claim when the facts remain accessible; (2) to enable the employer to provide medical care in order to minimize the employee’s injury. (citing Bucuk v. Edward A. Zusi Brass Foundry, 49 N.J. Super. 187, 199( App. Div.), certif. denied, 27 N.J. 398 (1958); Arthur Larson, 2B Workmen’s Compensation Law § 78.10 at 102 (1990)); See also Roberta Michelotti v. Civil Service Group, 92 N.J.A.R.2d (WCC) 73. Also, “the knowledge or notice required by the statute need not, of course, be knowledge or notice of an accident; it merely must be knowledge and notice ‘of the occurrence of the injury.’” General Cable Corp. v. Levins, 122 N.J.L. 383, 387 (1939). Further, “the knowledge may be described as that attributable to the famous ‘reasonable man’ in the ordinary course of business affairs.” Mitchell v. Mucon Corp., 51 N.J. Super. 208, 213 (Law Div. 1958) (citing Roberts v. Beitler, 34 N.J. Super. 470 (Cty. Ct. 1955); Calabria v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 4 N.J. 64 (1950); Allen v. City of Millville, 87 N.J.L. 356 (Sup. Ct. 1915), affirmed 88 N.J.L. 693 (E. & A. 1915)).